Inside court rooms, life-altering decisions are made. A judge may determine how much liberty will be lost, a decision that must be careful and principled, grounded in law rather than emotion.
In NSW, a proposed amendment to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 would restrict what judges may consider when imposing a sentence. The bill seeks to exclude “good character” as a mitigating factor, meaning an offender’s prior reputation and community standing could no longer influence the penalty.
The Victorian government in late February also announced plans to remove the use of ‘good character’ references at sentencing.
Supporters see this as an overdue correction. “As a survivor of child sexual abuse, I pursued this reform for the child who was told to be silent,” said Harrison James, co-founder of the “Your Reference Ain’t Relevant” campaign. His argument is clear: lived trauma should outweigh social reputation. Accountability, he says, must not be softened by status.
James’s advocacy, grounded in lived experience, deserves respect. However, the reform itself rests on a simplified view of how sentencing operates. It risks treating contextual evidence as endorsement and implies that reputation too often outweighs seriousness. In reality, courts are already required to prioritise the objective gravity of the offence.
While the original advocacy campaign was directed at sexual assault and rape, existing law already limits reliance on good character in certain child sexual offence cases, particularly where an offender’s reputation was used to facilitate the crime. The NSW Government has gone further, introducing legislation that would apply across all criminal offences, from drink driving to drug possession, with other states being urged to follow.
Inside court rooms, life-altering decisions are made. A judge may determine how much liberty will be lost, a decision that must be careful and principled, grounded in law rather than emotion.
In NSW, a proposed amendment to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 would restrict what judges may consider when imposing a sentence. The bill seeks to exclude “good character” as a mitigating factor, meaning an offender’s prior reputation and community standing could no longer influence the penalty.
The Victorian government in late February also announced plans to remove the use of ‘good character’ references at sentencing.
Supporters see this as an overdue correction. “As a survivor of child sexual abuse, I pursued this reform for the child who was told to be silent,” said Harrison James, co-founder of the “Your Reference Ain’t Relevant” campaign. His argument is clear: lived trauma should outweigh social reputation. Accountability, he says, must not be softened by status.
James’s advocacy, grounded in lived experience, deserves respect. However, the reform itself rests on a simplified view of how sentencing operates. It risks treating contextual evidence as endorsement and implies that reputation too often outweighs seriousness. In reality, courts are already required to prioritise the objective gravity of the offence.
While the original advocacy campaign was directed at sexual assault and rape, existing law already limits reliance on good character in certain child sexual offence cases, particularly where an offender’s reputation was used to facilitate the crime. The NSW Government has gone further, introducing legislation that would apply across all criminal offences, from drink driving to drug possession, with other states being urged to follow.
The proposal has attracted formal opposition from key legal bodies. The NSW Bar Association argues that abolishing good character will not address unequal access to justice, which would be better remedied through proper funding of services such as Legal Aid. The NSW Aboriginal Legal Service has likewise opposed the broader reform. Its chief executive, Nadine Miles, has instead called for greater public education about how sentencing works.
Under current law, the seriousness of the offence remains central. Harm and culpability anchor the sentencing decision. Good character is only one factor among many, and, in serious cases, it carries limited weight. It does not excuse the conduct or minimise harm. Instead, it helps a court assess prospects of rehabilitation, risk of reoffending and whether the offence was out of character. As Callum Parker of Hugo Law Group notes, a character reference does not dispute the crime; it provides context about the person before the court. Judges sentence people, not abstractions. Discretion is not a flaw in the system; it is part of its design.
The reform is framed as a response to privilege in the courtroom. But Australia’s criminal courts are not dominated by elites. They are disproportionately filled by the poor, the marginalised and the over-policed. Aboriginal people make up about 3.8 per cent of the population, yet account for more than 30 per cent of the adult prison population and around 60 per cent of youth detention. In that context, removing one way of presenting a person’s background is difficult to describe as a step toward greater fairness.
For first-time offenders, character evidence can show that the conduct was genuinely out of character. Without it, mitigation may rely more heavily on psychological reports or formal rehabilitation programs, resources not equally available to everyone. The risk is that paperwork becomes more valuable than community testimony or a stable work history.
Justice requires accountability. But it also recognises that a person is more than their worst act. Narrowing what judges can consider may make the law simpler, but it also makes it less precise. And imprecision in criminal justice rarely falls first on the powerful.
Harm matters. The question is whether justice is improved by limiting the information available to judges. A better focus may be on strengthening support for victims like Harrison without reducing the discretion that sentencing depends on.
The proposal has attracted formal opposition from key legal bodies. The NSW Bar Association argues that abolishing good character will not address unequal access to justice, which would be better remedied through proper funding of services such as Legal Aid. The NSW Aboriginal Legal Service has likewise opposed the broader reform. Its chief executive, Nadine Miles, has instead called for greater public education about how sentencing works.
Under current law, the seriousness of the offence remains central. Harm and culpability anchor the sentencing decision. Good character is only one factor among many, and, in serious cases, it carries limited weight. It does not excuse the conduct or minimise harm. Instead, it helps a court assess prospects of rehabilitation, risk of reoffending and whether the offence was out of character. As Callum Parker of Hugo Law Group notes, a character reference does not dispute the crime; it provides context about the person before the court. Judges sentence people, not abstractions. Discretion is not a flaw in the system; it is part of its design.
The reform is framed as a response to privilege in the courtroom. But Australia’s criminal courts are not dominated by elites. They are disproportionately filled by the poor, the marginalised and the over-policed. Aboriginal people make up about 3.8 per cent of the population, yet account for more than 30 per cent of the adult prison population and around 60 per cent of youth detention. In that context, removing one way of presenting a person’s background is difficult to describe as a step toward greater fairness.
For first-time offenders, character evidence can show that the conduct was genuinely out of character. Without it, mitigation may rely more heavily on psychological reports or formal rehabilitation programs, resources not equally available to everyone. The risk is that paperwork becomes more valuable than community testimony or a stable work history.
Justice requires accountability. But it also recognises that a person is more than their worst act. Narrowing what judges can consider may make the law simpler, but it also makes it less precise. And imprecision in criminal justice rarely falls first on the powerful.
Harm matters. The question is whether justice is improved by limiting the information available to judges. A better focus may be on strengthening support for victims like Harrison without reducing the discretion that sentencing depends on.
